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ABSTRACT 
Much has been made of the ‘imperial’ influence of international actors (Chopra 2000) 
and their view of Timor-Leste as a petri dish for post-conflict development. However, 
this view obscures the ways in which conflict-era actors and their networks shape 
core decision regarding resource allocation. This article examines the political 
economies of resistance-era networks in the post-conflict period, focusing specifically 
on the large-scale pensions programme. The article argues that these former fighters 
tasked with registration verification serve as ‘street level bureaucrats’ and have re-
shaped the programme to reflect their views of the conflict and interests. This is not a 
trivial matter – in 2015 the programme consumed 9 per cent of the national budget – 
and this work suggests that pensions should be viewed as a core aspect of post-
conflict economic development in Timor-Leste and, more broadly, that the role of 
conflict actors in defining such programmes is essential to understanding 
redistributive policies after conflict. 
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Don’t look to the law; look for stability. 
     (Former resistance member, Aileu District) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an article about the veranda (Terray 1986) and the business of governance 
that takes place there. It is about how policy that is written at centres of power is 
translated and transformed as it is implemented in the countryside; it is about the 
power that resides with the ‘street level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky 1971). To explore these 
dynamics, this article considers the mammoth veterans’ pension programme that 
arose following the cessation of conflict and Timorese independence, and it critically 
examines the registration of East Timorese former resistance members – the men 
and women who contributed to the quarter-century armed and clandestine struggles 
against Indonesian occupation (1974-1999). The pension programme, initially 
envisioned by international actors to serve mere thousands of formerly armed 
fighters, has grown to consume almost 9 per cent of the national budget as direct 
payments (2015 figure; Leach 2017, p. 213). Over 250,000 Timorese have 
registered; this represents approximately a third of the current population over the 
age of 15. 
 
Registration is the crucial first step of making subjects known and legible to the state 
in order to receive significant financial assistance. It is the step at which the legal 
definition of ‘veteran’ is applied and veterans are created as a legal category. This 
research explores how tens of thousands of Timorese have successfully registered, 
despite the narrowly drawn legal criteria. It finds that the high percentage of 
registered former resistance members, an estimated 60 per cent, that do not meet 
the eligibility criteria. And while registration errors and fraud are expected in any 
benefits programme,i deviation from the legal criteria appears to be the norm. Why is 
this the case? This article suggests that who is a ‘veteran’ in Timor-Leste – and thus 
eligible for these payments – is largely determined in the field, independent of the 
legal framework and the world of policy makers. This matters: pension payments are 
already a significant percentage of state expenditure and pension payments 
transform the post-conflict economic lives of recipients and leave behind those found 
ineligible. 
 
In Timor-Leste, the pensions programme is sweeping in scope and recognises 
thousands of veterans that do not meet the legal criteria. To understand this problem, 
I use a lens offered by Walker and Gibson, and view this ‘gap between objectives 
and outcomes’ – here the low level of adherence to legal registration criteria – as a 
‘demonstration of how policy is recreated through the process of implementation, 
rather than an implementation failure’ (2004, p. 1251; my emphasis). In Timor-Leste, 
this gap arises from the systematic re-imagining of what service merits recognition by 
the former resistance members who, as state agents, have led the registration and 
vetting processes. Indeed, veteranhood hinges on service and contribution, concepts 
that resist simplification in a conflict characterised by decades of clandestine action 
and irregular combat. Fraudulent claims are not the results of incompetence or 
negligence, although these may also be at play, they are the realisation of a new 
policy – a corrective to legislation issues from the capital, Dili. On the ground, 
registration follows on a consistent set of parallel metrics used by commissioners 
tasked with registering their former comrades, namely a distinction between ‘direct’ 
or armed service and ‘indirect’ service.  
 
To conceptualise this dynamic, I argue that in Timor-Leste power is exercised and 
policy is made in both the 'le climatiseur et la veranda' (‘the air-conditioning and the 
veranda,’ Terray 1986). As Berman explains these archetypal sites: ‘[t]he first is the 
face of modern state power, bureaucratic omnipotence and technical expertise the 
avatar of modernity; the second is the scene of the real business of government 
[through] patronage’ (1998, p. 335). I include in this category of patronage the 
Timorese resistance movement, which served as a system of governance and 
legitimate authority through the Indonesian occupation and into the post-conflict 
period, where it now interpenetrates the formal state apparatus (see Myrttinen 2013). 
By contrast, the avatars of modern state power are both Timorese bureaucrats, often 
educated outside of Timor-Leste during the occupation, and the international 
advisors that helped to shape the legal framework for determining who should count 
as a veteran. 
 
In focusing on the interactions on the veranda, this article is rooted in anthropological 
work on the micro-interactions between citizens and state actors, namely ‘street-level 
bureaucrats.’ Based on their studies of educational policy reforms, Weatherly and 
Lipsky argue that ‘[i]n a significant sense … street-level bureaucrats are the 
policymakers in their respective work arenas’ (1977, p. 172). Accordingly, policy has 
to be studied both in its conceptualisation at the centre as well as its implementation 
at the periphery as the ‘meaning of policy cannot be known until it is worked out in 
practice at the street level’ (Ibid, p. 173). This street-level perspective is missing from 
most of the ‘top-down’ best practices disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration 
(DDR) literature. Reflecting the difficulty of studying this cohort, little is known about 
how such policies are (re)interpreted and ‘[play] out on-the-ground’ (Jennings 2008, 
p. 5). Addressing this gap, this article examines policy formation on the ground and 
demonstrates how this shapes welfare spending and thus the post-conflict economy.  
 
Beyond offering a key aspect of how so many former resistance members have 
become registered in Timor-Leste, this perspective has wider implications for how we 
study and understand post-conflict reconstruction policies. Firstly, it underscores the 
lack of fixity of legislation and legally enshrined identity categories like ‘veteran.’ 
Secondly, in recognising the lack of fixity, this work indicates limits to the powers of 
both bureaucratic elites and external actors to drive outcomes on the ground. 
Attention to the agency of the former combatants who implement policy from ‘the 
veranda’ is necessary to understand the patterns and unimagined growth of the 
programme. The confident disregard that the commissioners tasked with veterans’ 
registration expressed towards state legislation, suggests an important, yet under-
recognised, site of power in the post-conflict reconstruction process. These leaders 
saw it within their legitimate authority to rework this legislation, and this authority was 
rooted in non-state sites of power and history. Finally, this work complicates the 
discussion of the extension of the state through registration – a paradigmatic 
bureaucratic practice. Taken together, this article suggests the need for research to 
critically interrogate the journey of seemingly technocratic legislation from page to 
practice. 
 
Regarding organisation, this article begins by taking the perspective of the ‘air 
conditioning’ and briefly reviewing the legislative framework established by 
technocrats in the capital, Dili, with the guidance of international advisors. This 
baseline established, the article goes on to analyse the work done on ‘the veranda’ 
on two levels. Firstly, it looks at the registration of ineligible individuals, distinguishing 
at the micro-level between cases that follow patterns of graft or nepotism 
(‘corruption’) and those that mark the systematic application of alternate eligibility 
criteria (‘correctives’), providing evidence of both dynamics. In this discussion the 
position of former leaders cum commissioners as gatekeepers and power brokers is 
key. Here, commissioners use their control over inclusion in the veterans’ registry to 
support their own patronage networks.  
 
The brief discussion and concluding sections return to the implications of this work, 
noting both the contribution to the study of legislative enactment as well as more 
broadly to how we should understand the interaction of pre-existing non-state 
networks and the work done by cosmopolitan legislators and their advisors. This 
work, as well as that of other authors in this special issue, thus also seeks to add 
insight to the questions of how peace economies are formed and how policies that 
have important effects on post-conflict economies are made. As this article points 
out, in Timor-Leste, networks and identities drive this policy-making and 
implementation process, and I therefore illustrate the connection – rather than 
suggest a rupture – between power, identity, and authority in the conflict and post-
conflict periods. This work thus advances our understanding of the political economy 
of post-conflict resource distribution.  
 
A Note on Methodology 
This article is based on two rounds of extensive fieldwork and surveying carried out 
over nine months in 2010 and 2012 in Timor-Leste during important periods of 
veterans’ registration. The fieldwork included a population proportional, 
representative randomised survey of 224 former combatants (for more on this 
methodology and the nature of these networks, see Roll 2014). This dataset is 
amongst the half-dozen largest ever generated globally on former combatants. A 
database of registered former resistance members served as a comprehensive 
sampling framework, from which registered former resistance members that were 
eligible for financial assistance were selected. The database provided information on 
age, place of birth, and registered length and type of service. Accordingly, the survey 
included items used to determine veteran status and the level of recognition, thereby 
allowing for a comparison with the state database.  
 
To strengthen this survey work, the study took a mixed methods approach and 
included 90 individual interviews, archival research, and observation. This included 
interviews with senior policy makers, advisors, resistance and clandestine leaders, 
and military officials, as well as with former resistance members not captured in the 
survey, such as those who had been vetted and expunged from the registry. In some 
cases key informants were re-interviewed to understand their perspectives on what 
had changed in the intervening period. I conducted the majority of surveys and 
interviews in Tetum. My position as a white, Western-educated female and academic 
researcher placed me as a clear outsider. However, these characteristics, including 
the gender dynamics of studying primarily male former combatants, at times enabled 
rather than impeded access; key interlocutors often found my presence novel and 
un-threatening. Furthermore, the interviews were carried out at a time of 
dissatisfaction with the pensions programme, and respondents were often keen to 
have their voices heard, viewing the subject as pressing rather than sensitive. This 
article primarily draws on interviews with commissioners and a period of observation 
during which the author travelled with the Data Verification Team, tasked with 
reviewing and correcting lists of registered former resistance members; it also draws 
upon empirical results from the survey. 
 
VETERANS’ PENSIONS IN THE AIR CONDITIONING 
Establishing veterans’ pensions and payments has been a core concern of 
metropolitan policy makers, political leaders, and international security advisors 
concerned with re-mobilisation at the end of the 24-year Indonesian occupation of 
Timor-Leste in 1999. During the UNTAET transitional period (1999-2002), the 
mandate to support former resistance members is enshrined in the Constitution, 
which calls for the state to ‘[protect] all those who participated in the resistance 
against the foreign occupation’ (Section 11, Articles 1-4, 2002). In its open embrace 
of broad-based suffering, Leach argues that this clause provides the ‘symbolic heart’ 
of the document; ‘[the] constitution recognises and sacralises the resistance as the 
core tradition of the independent state’ (Leach 2002, p. 43). This commitment should, 
I argue, also be understood as the economic heart of the document. In examining 
post-conflict political economies, such statements carry profound implications for 
state spending and the expectations for how state funds will be allocated.  
 
Surprisingly, this interest in pensions benefits and their role in post-conflict 
reintegration and economic development are not reflected in the academic literature. 
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programmes have been 
studied in terms of their effectiveness (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004; Gilligan et al. 
2010) and political aspects (Berdal and Ucko 2009). Critical DDR scholarship has 
begun to connect DDR to state formation (Metsola 2006, 2010) and examine how 
programmes advance the priorities of implementing actors (Kriger 2003; Muggah 
2009); these foundational works highlight how the politics of identity can be played 
out in such programmes, creating new histories and claims to state resources.  
However, short-term DDR programmes are generally designed by international 
actors to ‘buy time’ in the post-conflict period (McMullin 2013, p. 38), and are aptly 
caricatured by Knight and Özerdem (2004) as ‘gun, camps and cash.’ Pensions, by 
contrast, are of a significant duration – in some cases even multi-generational – and 
thus play a different role in post-conflict economic development and resource 
distribution. Due to these factors, pensions can significantly shape institutional 
development. Skocpol argues this in her landmark work describing the ‘pioneering 
effect’ of Civil War veterans’ pensions on the development of the USA welfare 
systems (1993, p. 116). This article takes a first step towards drawing similar 
connections between pensions and post-conflict socio-economic policy in a case of 
modern state building.  
In Timor-Leste, efforts to establish veterans’ benefits began in September 2002 with 
the creation of two presidential commissions to focus on recording the names of 
former resistance members from the 1975-1979 and 1980-1999 conflict periods, 
respectively; these commissions worked together. Of note, the designated periods 
ireflect key changes in the conflict; the first period was typified by mass mobilisation, 
including civilian movements into remote support bases (base de apoiu). However, 
Indonesian forces overwhelmed these efforts. While some armed resistance fighters 
remained in the jungles, the second part of the conflict involved clandestine action by 
men and women in towns and cities. Clandestine organisations emerged around the 
country as well as abroad, which became increasingly coordinated and effective in 
drawing attention to the occupation.  
 
This registration work was supported by the World Bank, and involved a series of 
public consultations. However, the work of these commissions preceded national 
legislation, and, as a result, these commissions developed their own lengthy 
questionnaire regarding service and then used this data to create eligibility criteria for 
registration. The first two commissions’ results, which excluded women, drew a 
public outcry, leading to the establishment to the second commission. Despite the 
absence of legislation, the commissions initiated monthly payments to well-
connected, prominent former resistance leaders, many of whom had taken political 
posts. These issues and omissions lead to the establishment in 2004 of a third 
commission, to specifically register members of the clandestine resistance, which 
finally included female resistance members.  
 
The passage of the Law on Status of National Liberation Combatants (hereafter the 
2006 Law) and the Law on Pensions for Combatants and Martyrs of National 
Liberation (Pensions Law, Decree Law 16/2008) codified registrants’ identities, rights 
and benefits, formalising and bureaucratising hitherto status-driven, ad hoc system of 
payments. While the 2006 Law established eligibility, the 2008 Pensions Law 
established the corresponding entitlement payments structures. Since the law’s 
passage, Parliament has regularly amended the legislation to increase the value of 
benefits payments. While in the initial regime payments ranged from 85 USD to 550 
USD per month, since the programme’s inception the lowest benefit levels have, on 
average, more than tripled; the base level of benefit for a living former resistance 
member currently stands at 276 USD/month.ii  
Of critical importance, in Article 23, the 2006 Law introduces the concept of 
‘exclusive dedication,’ defined as full-time service within a resistance organisation 
and/or incarceration. Periods of service that do not meet these standards, for 
example clandestine work from within a village, do not count towards pension 
eligibility. According to the 2008 Pensions Law, whether an individual receives a 
monthly pension, a one-off payment, or nothing at all depends upon how many years 
of exclusive dedication to the resistance are recognised by the verification 
commissions and reflected in the veterans’ pensions registry. Only those recognised 
with more than seven years of exclusive dedication are eligible for monthly 
payments, and only those with more that four years of exclusive dedication are 
eligible for a one off payment – a high bar. 
 
The category of ‘exclusive dedication’ focuses on sustained, armed (and thus largely 
male) participation – a narrow view of the scope of Timorese resistance movement 
and its history. While the early period of the conflict were characterized by armed 
resistance, the movement collapsed in the late 1970s. This had profound 
consequences for the fighters and their supporters. As one long-time observer 
described:  
There was a comprehensive defeat, and people were swallowed up in the [Indonesian] 
social system. People were absorbed into the Indonesian state; it had full penetration. 
Veterans thus joined the enemy’s system, signed up and collaborated (INT18).  
He concludes: ‘If you were not in the jungle, you were collaborating’ (INT18). As the 
resistance weakened and fractured, such ‘exclusive dedication’ became increasingly 
rare; in the 1980s, the resistance was rebuilt around clandestine action.  
 
Political leaders who drew support from networks of armed rather than clandestine 
actors, and thus were favoured in the formulation, advocated for this approach, as 
did international advisors. The effort to favour these supporters through the law, 
according to one high-level Timorese political advisor and former resistance leader, 
created political tensions amongst the leadership. As he notes:  
There was a big dispute about the law. It was written based on the legislation from other 
countries. It was given from Alkatiri to Ana Pesoa without review by Gusmão. Gusmão 
was very angry – he had issues with exclusive dedication (INT73).iii  
Even from the beginning, there was concern amongst lawmakers with exclusive 
dedication and what it would mean in regards to the recognition – or non-recognition 
– of former resistance actors. 
 
These lawmakers’ concerns have been born out. Survey work carried out in 2012 
found that while the vast majority of respondents had participated in the resistance to 
some degree, often residing in the support bases or taking part in the clandestine 
front, the majority of respondents did not meet the standard of exclusive dedication 
(see Chart 1 below), as laid out by the law. The next section considers how and why 
this legislation was re-cast by those involved in its implementation. 
 
[INSERT CHART I] 
 
Chart 1: Meeting the Legal Criteria, Eligibility and Non-eligibility by Sub-District 
 
 
THE VIEW FROM THE VERANDA 
While embedded with the national veterans’ pension programme’s Data Verification 
Team in 2010 in Laleia, Manatuto district,iv our morning routine was to walk to the 
meeting hall, stopping on prominent community members’ wide porches for sweet 
black coffee. We would sit on the veranda with our host, his wife and daughters 
invariably hanging back in the doorway, and observe people go by carrying goods or 
ferrying uniformed children to school on the backs of motorbikes. The team’s leader, 
Alin Laek, a prominent figure from the Timorese resistance movement who had been 
based in the area, would enquire after family members and exchange gossip and 
pleasantries before moving onwards. These encounters were warm and enjoyable; I 
started to see Alin Laek as a ‘local boy made good’ or, in the North American mode, 
the charismatic captain of the high school football team, back from the big city for the 
homecoming game, reliving moments of glory.   
 
Yet these relaxed exchanges were also much more significant. These conversations 
and the meetings that followed, wherein disputes concerning inclusion on the 
veterans’ pension registry were summarily resolved, constitute the leading edge of 
state power. Recalling the distinction between the 'le climatiseur et la veranda,' what 
I observed on the veranda with Alin Laek was the maintenance of personal power 
networks – networks often even pre-dating the Timorese resistance movement – and 
their reinforcement through the careful distribution of state resources. Far from the 
tiled offices of Chinese-built ministries of the Timorese capital, Dili, it is on such 
verandas that post-conflict reintegration programmes take shape and life. There, 
through the micro-level interactions between Alin Laek’s team and registrants, 
eligibility criteria and thus the programmes more broadly were reimagined to reflect 
both actors’ understandings of service and sacrifice, obligations and ambitions. 
 
In this section I explore deviation from veterans’ pension benefits selection criteria 
and provide examples of how, on the micro-level, commissioners have used their 
discretion to both sell access to reintegration benefits (‘corruption’) as well as 
introduce alternative criteria for registering individuals (‘correction’). v  Corrupt 
practices include nepotism and rent-seeking behaviour (e.g. providing access to 
benefits in exchange for payment). By contrast, in what I dub ‘corrective’ behaviour, 
commissioners systematically and consistently deviate from the legal criteria based 
on alternative notions of who deserves to be included. In this case, the 
commissioners reject the policy or legislation and, in its place, follow norms or rules 
derived from other, extra-legal systems of values and authority. Together, 
proximately, these practices begin to account for the high numbers of ineligible 
individuals on the registry. 
 
This distinction between corrupt and corrective practices is made, however, with the 
recognition that these categories are not mutually exclusive or uncomplicated. Our 
‘street-level bureaucrats’ – the commissioners – wear multiple hats, have personal 
relationships with prospective registrants, and face a range of pressures and 
incentives. Commissioners may register an individual for multiple reasons, such as 
both family connections and a belief in the need to register former clandestine 
members, or use values-based discourses to mask or justify transactional 
arrangements and reinforce their own networks. However, by highlighting the two 
dynamics separately, I underscore the prominence of justificatory discourses and the 
openness with which the use of alternate criteria, across commissions, is discussed. 
In the case of ‘correctives,’ rather than this reinterpretation happening surreptitiously, 
commissioners openly view themselves as authorities and authors. Furthermore, 
while authors such as Hoffman (2003) have discussed corruption in DDR practice, 
the normative content that distinguishes ‘correctives’ has not been explored. Nor 
have other authors discussed how making adjustments to fit community norms may 
also serve as a conflict mitigation strategy and stem problems with social jealousy 
arising from differential treatment and the provision of pay-outs; ironically, violating 
the legislative framework may in the short-term aid integration.  
 
Corruption: Rent-Seeking, Nepotism and Patronage 
As noted above, the hijacking of reintegration benefits for personal enrichment and 
the maintenance of non-state networks has been documented in a number of 
contexts (see Jennings 2007, p. 209-10, on Liberia). Hoffman paints a vivid picture of 
how former rebel leaders exact rents by controlling access to reintegration benefits in 
Sierra Leone. He gives the example of ex-commanders charging former fighters for 
physical access to the stadium in which international organisations provided benefits: 
A third or a half of the newly minted ex-combatant’s pay packet seemed a fair trade for the 
opportunity to pass through disarmament and train for a job in post-war Sierra Leone. The 
upshot was that only those who had made the necessary bargains with their commanders 
had any hope of passing through the locked gate to the inside of the stadium (Hoffman 
2003, p. 297). 
In Hoffman’s example, ex-commanders act as gatekeepers – literally and figuratively 
– and the access to reintegration benefits is negotiated. Those who can pay are 
included, even if ineligible, and those who cannot are excluded. The result is the 
diversion of resources from their intended beneficiaries and their exploitation for the 
benefit of ‘big men.’ Similarly, in Timor-Leste, commissioners stand at the nexus of 
state, resistance, political party, and kinship networks. 
 
In Timor-Leste, such bribes as well as nepotism constitute a major concern for 
respondents, even amongst those who were ineligible for veterans’ pensions 
themselves. Respondents described how commissioners use their positions as 
gatekeepers to either extract rents, as above, or to include ineligible individuals due 
to pre-existing, family ties. The most commonly cited issues included the registration 
of ineligible associates or family members; the inflation of associates’ or family 
members’ service records; the exclusion of individuals or reduction of their service 
records due to personal disputes; and demands of payments to be registered. Less 
extreme examples were also consistently cited, including the use of personal 
connections to those in power to fast-track payments or resolve issues with 
registration. Concerning government project contracts, multiple informants discussed 
issues ranging from poor service delivery to pressure from non-resistance members 
to use their names as veterans to register companies.   
 
In regards to bribery, respondents in both survey and elite interviews consistently 
identified such corrupt practices. Parallel to Hoffman’s example, some must pay to 
be included in the programme. As one survey participant described:  
I am concerned with corruption. People have paid in order to receive longer durations. The 
latest list did not include my name… my son went and checked. There was no 
explanation. If you speak with the Commission, they will ask for money, more than just $5, 
$100-200, for example. People give mobile phones, cigarettes (SUR125). 
A former commission member confirmed this pattern of bribery, noting that some 
commissioners have demanded 50 per cent of the registrant’s payment (INT78). 
While upset by this corruption, the survey respondent quoted above pragmatically 
suggested that the issue with his registration could only be resolved through 
recourse to personal ties: ‘I need to go to Aileu; I know someone on the Commission’ 
(SUR125). Furthermore, due to strong redistributive norms, even when kickbacks are 
not explicitly demanded, there might be an expectation that recipients share their 
payments. 
 
Nepotism also emerged as a key concern. As one village chief underscored: ‘There 
are people in the clandestine front with more years [being counted towards higher 
pension benefits] than those in the armed front. The Commission has looked to its 
family members’ (INT68). Here, due to nepotism, those with a type of service not 
recognised for pension eligibility (clandestine) were being recognised with longer 
service records – and thus higher levels of pension payments – than those who had 
completed armed service. The registration of family members was, according to one 
former commissioner and resistance actor, de rigueur. As he notes: ‘I refused to put 
my wife and mother on the registry, like other commission members. Everyone asked 
me: why not?’ (INT78). The inclusion of family members of prominent actors, not just 
commissioners, also appeared widespread. A former clandestine leader notes: ‘The 
zone secretary registered his family, gave them really big benefits … they all got 8-14 
years’ (INT87). Similarly, as one District Administrator explained: ‘[t]here are some 
who were just in the village and worked as functionaries – they got 15 years! If the 
woman is the man’s wife, she’ll get it’ (INT71). vi  This raises additional concerns 
regarding the eligibility of women included on the pensions registry (see Niner 2011, 
on gender in post-conflict Timor-Leste). 
 
Vulnerability to nepotism reflects the very design of the registration programme as 
well as the structure of the resistance itself. As De Vries and Wiegink note:  
DDR practitioners may purposefully work through combatant associations, which help set 
priorities and select candidates for the programme in a confused melee of competing 
individuals … [this] provides plenty of opportunities for nepotism (2011, p. 43).  
The strength, cultural importance, and density of kinship networks in Timor-Leste 
make issues with nepotism particularly difficult to combat. In the case that an 
individual’s registration has been challenged, the registrant may use family 
connections to secure a person in authority to come testify and support their claims. 
As one informant described: ‘[i]f one Nurep,’ a leader of a clandestine cell, ‘won’t 
testify on their behalf then they will find another who will from their family. There has 
been so much intermarriage now’ (INT78). As very few records of participation exist, 
and resistance networks were rebuilt along family lines, such counter-claims from 
family members are difficult to refute.  
 
Finally, resistance leaders cum commissioners tasked with registering individuals 
and verifying their data have used their roles to support their former cadres. 
Reintegration ‘goods’, namely access to payments, provide a means to define and 
sustain non-state patronage networks into the post-conflict period. As helpfully noted 
by a reviewer, this argument echoes that of Le Billion who, in addition to recognising 
the corrosive effects of corruption on some institutions, also suggests that corruption 
is part of the fabric – and even the active weaving – of social relations. He writes: 
‘[C]orruption is endogenous to many political structures in which it serves key 
hierarchical functions, thereby contributing to political order’ (2003, p. 414). The 
commissioners were part of both the hierarchy of the resistance, as well as now 
acting as part of the new state; these flows of resources reinforced this authority. 
Similarly, the support of family networks reflects the very organization of the 
resistance, and the importance of family ties, particularly in the clandestine period 
(McWilliam 2005, p. 35). 
 
The engagement of resistance-era authorities to administer these programmes 
makes this registration work possible, yet this also facilitates the privatisation and 
personalisation of state resources (see Ménard in Erdmann and Engel 2006, p. 14). 
These programmes are key to the political economies of resistance-era networks in 
the post-conflict period. The ability to provide resources to networks is a source of 
power for former resistance leaders; having state resources flow through these 
networks effects who benefits. This finding reinforces the view that reintegration 
programmes should not be viewed simply through the lens of security but also in 
relation to bureaucratic state power and the authority to determine where state 
resources go. The use of state resources to control potential spoilers and draw their 
networks into the state sphere has consequences for state consolidation, 
governance, and the livelihoods of Timorese people. The story does not end with 
paying off spoilers. These ‘solutions’ to security issues shape the new state, where 9 
per cent of its budgetary resources go, and thus the distribution of wealth in the new, 
post-conflict economy. 
 
From a policy perspective, attention to these networks, patronage, and neo-
patrimonialism, and, crucially, their highly contextual views of what service should be 
recognised, avoids incomplete analysis that focuses simply on corrupt practices. 
Indeed, one weakness in the technical DDR literature is a lack of attention to 
implementation and the role of networks and loyalties therein and the views of the 
‘street level bureaucrats’ tasked with implementation. For example, the UN 
Development Programme and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ 
recommendations on eligibility and registration for DDR programmes simply suggest 
that commanders ‘deliver’ their subordinates to be registered by UN personnel 
(IDDRS 2010, p. 44). In cases in which implementers are chosen because of their 
pre-existing relationships to conflict actors, this process of delivering or identifying 
registrants is complex and important. Comprehensive and apparently legitimate 
alternative criteria are currently in use. The combination of state and non-state 
authority makes such arrangements highly resilient and difficult to challenge 
(Ilkhamov 2007, p. 80).  
 
Correctives: Renegotiating the Criteria  
While no respondents defended the corrupt practices listed above, the 
commissioners openly discussed other ways in which they modified eligibility 
requirements. As one stated confidently: ‘We have flexibility’ (SUR272). As street-
level bureaucrats, commissioners have established alternate criteria, resulting in a 
lex non scripta that expands the scope of eligibility to meet community expectations. 
In particular, the criteria have been expanded to recognise special service and 
incorporate members of the clandestine front. These modifications reflect a range of 
popular pressures on commissioners as well as their own views. These 
considerations include the need to reconcile criteria with local concepts of merit, 
status, special service, and rights; concerns with social jealousy; and the political 
mobilisation and lobbying of interested parties. Away from the policy-making arena, 
these actors are renegotiating and recreating the policy.  
 
The use of an alternative system for calculating years of recognised service appears 
to be both consistent and widespread; this marks a systematic reimagining of the 
policy as well as, more surreally, conflict histories. One commissioner explained the 
system:  
Those who contributed directly can receive 4-7 years. Those who contributed indirectly, 
just a little, there are not criteria for them to receive payments. What does a direct 
contribution mean? To give money, clothes, food; to carry water. For this you can give 4-7 
years, 8-14. All the commissions use a system like this (SUR272; my emphasis). 
The commissioner describes a coherent and logical heuristic for allocating benefits; it 
is neither highly personalised nor ad hoc, and it continues to enforce certain limits 
that centre on an individual’s contribution (i.e. ‘indirect’ support, such as women 
preparing food or a young person carrying a message, is not recognised; ‘direct’ 
support is conceived as involving armed service, risk taking, as well as forms of 
material support, as described above). It is a simple to understand and rooted in their 
cohort’s conceptions of service and what matters; this rubric provides more space for 
the contributions by women and youth, but the ‘indigenisation’ of these criteria still 
reflect power structures and gender bias within Timor-Leste. In this manner, it is in 
some ways more legitimate than the system developed by Timorese technocrats and 
international advisors. However, despite its advantages, the distinction between 
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ contributions is completely novel – these criteria are not derived 
from the law.  
 
Deviating from the policy and using the concept of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ contributions 
appears legitimate as it grounded in widespread normative beliefs. Communities 
have ‘unmet expectations’ (INT63), as one UN Political Affairs officer described, 
concerning the need to recognise service. In particular, both respondents and 
commissioners identified payments as a transcendent right of individuals who 
served, justifying the registration of clandestine actors in particular even though their 
service is not recognised under Timorese law. As one former Nurep (a position in the 
clandestine front) deeply involved with the registration process stated:  
The regulations] don't work… If you do it according [to the law] they will still be victims. 
Youth that were just born could not have carried guns, but according to human rights. It is 
according to a principle (INT89). 
He viewed ignoring the legal criteria as essential to realising the rights of clandestine 
actors,vii regarding the law as unequipped to recognise their service. Similarly, one 
commissioner and key leader stated: ‘[t]hose with more than three years. All of them 
should get money; the law cannot obliterate their rights’ (INT77). Here he positions 
the law as hostile to rights, while, critically, still looking to apply a rule or framework 
(e.g. ‘more than three years’). This idea of a right to compensation, independent of 
the law, was frequently echoed. 
 
In addition to calculating benefits based on the concepts of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ 
service, commissioners also appear to take into account the importance of individual 
contributions, rewarding special contributions or participation in significant historical 
events. In this case, ‘years of service’ were allocated as rewards to mark significant 
service and did not relate to time served. Again, ‘years’ emerge as the currency of 
the commissions, rather than a marker of time; this distorts the historical record 
created by the registry. As one prominent former resistance member who worked as 
a medic described: ‘I first received 4-7 years, but I have received support from Lere, 
Alin Laek and others to increase my dedication to 8-14 years to recognise my 
contribution and nursing’ (INT22). Here his particular skill set and critical access to 
needed medications was rewarded with a monthly pension; his on-going connections 
to those in power facilitated this adjustment. In another example, in the case of the 
Nain Feto sub-district, Dili district, I interviewed five individuals who were also 
allocated 8-14 years of service; this duration entitles registrants to significant monthly 
pension payments. None served with ‘exclusive dedication’ for this period. However, 
each had participated in the 12 November demonstrations. These demonstrations 
culminated in the Santa Cruz Massacre, a major turning point in the conflict. Their 
high number of ‘years’ exclusively reflected their participation in this key event.viii 
 
The decision by commissioners to expand these criteria should be contextualised by 
looking at both community expectations and the broader political dynamics. 
Commissioners experience pressure from politically powerful mobilised groups 
demanding inclusion. For example, the high levels of benefits awarded to the Santa 
Cruz massacre survivors reflects the political mobilisation of protest participants in 
the 12 November Committee. Established in 2010 by Gregorio Saldanha, the 12 
November Committee represents over two thousand survivors, the majority of whom 
are urban unemployed (ICG 2011, p. 8, note 64). The 12 November Committee has 
used its clout and participant listsix to pressure commissioners to include participants 
in the massacre on the grounds of special service. One key government official 
involved in the pension programme characterised the 12 November Committee as 
feeling ‘marginalised,’ pointing out that it ‘thinks we should recognise special service’ 
(INT67). While recognising survivors’ ineligibility, he appeared disinclined to remove 
those who were registered or instruct commissioners to exclude such actors.x  
 
Modifications to eligibility criteria and registration practices also resolve tensions 
between the capital and the veranda, between state actors (the commissioners) and 
the ex-resistance members at the grassroots level. As one Timorese political advisor 
explained: ‘[c]riteria, these created tensions. They pitted the Homage Commission 
against the veterans’ (INT65). The main point of contention has been the exclusion of 
clandestine actors, particularly those who made special contributions, due to the 
focus in the eligibility criteria on armed rather than clandestine service. Accordingly, 
the modifications described above have resulted in the systematic inclusion of higher 
numbers of clandestine actors on the registry, thereby partially addressing this 
tension between the commissioners, the law, and resistance actors. This reflects the 
pressures on commissioners as well as the related concern that the strict application 
of the legal criteria, and thus the broad exclusion of clandestine actors, would result 
in higher community-level tensions.  
Concern with violence or social jealousy stemming from the strict application of legal 
criteria is not unfounded. As one UN Political Affairs officer noted, the lack of 
recognition is a potential flash-point: ‘[a]ll people are concerned about exclusion of 
the clandestine front because of exclusive dedication. This could generate conflict. 
There are expectations that remain unmet’ (INT63; my emphasis). By registering 
members of the clandestine front, such as those who provided ‘direct support,’ 
commissioners address these expectations extra-legally and realign the programme 
with local conceptualisations of fairness, merit, and seniority.xi As one respondent put 
it succinctly, in regards to understanding registration patterns, ‘[d]on’t look to the law, 
look for stability’ (SUR69). In his view, the criteria were modified to increase security. 
Ironically, while reintegration benefits are conceptualised as a means of improving 
post-conflict stability, in Timor-Leste, the violation of eligibility criteria and the 
decision to recognise ‘direct’ support by clandestine actors has become important for 
reducing tensions – a dynamic that should be taken seriously in post-conflict 
contexts. 
 
Finally, these decisions to modify eligibility criteria are also part of the machinery of 
post-conflict history making. Those on the veranda are keenly involved in directing 
processes of official remembering and forgetting through the inclusion and exclusion 
of individual on the registry; these processes may restore normalcy for some but 
leave wounds open for others. The most pointed example comes from the treatment 
of collaboration with the occupying Indonesian forces or state by the commissions; 
part of their role is to identify and remove those who collaborated from the veterans’ 
pensions registration list. While the legislation explicitly excludes those who 
collaborated from being included on the registry and receiving benefits, it appears 
that this prohibition has been observed only selectively. xii  Discussions of 
collaboration with the Indonesian occupying forces, more widespread than is 
publically acknowledged, remain taboo (Drexler 2013, p. 75; INT18). As one senior 
UN Political Affairs officer notes: ‘If you lived here, you collaborated’ (INT33). Due to 
the length and complexity of the conflict, some of these same men and women who 
fought or contributed to the resistance in substantive ways also collaborated.  
 
It is worth noting that there not all state bureaucrats embraced recourse to ‘the 
veranda.’ Regarding the resolution of collaboration cases a young, Indonesian-
trained official wanted to enact these processes through technocratic means: ‘I want 
it to take place confidentially, in an office behind closed doors; this is not popular 
justice with the elders as judges. This [process] creates new problems and opens up 
new wounds’ (INT07). This comment is an indication of the tensions that do exist 
between these localities, and that these ‘street level’ practices do not resolve all 
issues. While commissioners, as agents of the state with patrons at the top of 
ministries and state institutions, experience wide latitude, there exists countervailing 
pressure to reassert legal criteria and processes. This can be observed in the 
oscillation between the opening and closing, adding and subtracting, to the veteran 
lists. 
 
Now, in the post-conflict period, the registration process is ill equipped to address 
this complexity. As one senior UN Political Affairs officer notes: ‘Nothing is clear! … 
There is no black and white; it is all a matter of degrees. The process is not 
recognizing shades of grey’ (INT33). Without a mechanism for recognising these 
‘shades of grey,’ commissioners decide whether to valorise individuals or pursue 
their exclusion. If fully enforced, many individuals would be excluded. And the 
processes of investigation and verification would be deeply unsettling for many who 
adhere to ‘histories of innocence,’ seeing complex actions during conflict, which may 
have included collaboration and betrayal, as exceptional (see Theidon 2010). More 
importantly, these exclusions and investigations would challenge the nation 
mythology of a united, apolitical resistance. These narratives crucially ‘obscur[e] the 
more troubling knowledge of the collaboration that pervaded the conflict over 
decades’ (Drexler 2013, p. 89). The non-enforcement of these prohibitions protects 
this mythology. Commissioners, working on the veranda, have systematically wiped 
away these ambiguities; through this ‘corrective’ they create a registry of flawless 
blacks and whites.  
 
DISCUSSION: ‘THOSE WHO WERE SMALL, ARE STILL SMALL’  
In taking on the questions of how and why the pensions programme in Timor-Leste 
has grown so large, including the registration of hundreds of thousands of Timorese, 
despite the narrow eligibility criteria, this article has argued that this cannot be 
understood as simple fraud or incompetence. Instead, I find that former conflict 
actors, acting as ‘street level bureaucrats’, have re-written the eligibility criteria and 
re-invented the veteran in Timor-Leste. Due to the status of former combatants within 
the political system and the manner in which these changes resolved core tensions, 
these formulations have not been widely challenged. This work, more broadly, brings 
us to the world of post-conflict political economy and helps us to understand the 
means by which formal conflict actors re-direct significant resources towards their 
networks, further entrenching their positions of authority. This work thus joins 
scholarship by Pugh, et. al., in examining the continuities and connections between 
conflict and post-conflict economies, in this case looking particularly at how conflict 
actors’ interests become expressed in policy outcomes.    
 
As noted previously, this work shares an interest in the ways the DDR programmes, 
connect to the larger project of re-imagining society and the role of former 
combatants therein. As Metsola argues, ‘“[r]eintegration” combines regimenting 
biopolitics with governmental techniques that aim at reforming and civilising subjects’ 
(2006, p. 1125); here, in a locally-led programme, we see the added complexity of 
state agents enacting their own concepts of service and eligibility, a different form of 
disciplining unruly subjects and writing histories. Similarly, while Muggah points out 
that reintegration ‘amounts to social engineering – from re-housing, resettling and 
integrating former soldiers and their families in areas that may be hostile to them – is 
ambitious in the extreme,’ this can be pushed further (2009, p. 14; see Paris on 
peace-building as social engineering, 1997, p. 56). This article, in considering 
pensions, sharpens these observation by exploring who is doing the social 
engineering and how. It also expands the examination of ‘social engineering’ to 
address not only about housing and training, but also benefits allocation and who 
gets what in the new economy.  
What type of peace will this form resource allocation bring? What are the 
consequences of these networks taking state resources on in the post-conflict 
period? Many of the former fighters interviewed expected the post-conflict period to 
deliver new opportunities and remove former inequalities, bringing a form of positive 
peace. The desire for former resistance members to control this process, rather than 
the state, fits within this context of expectations for new economic lives and agency 
after conflict. However, it is not clear that these benefits will address inequalities, 
particularly those that originated in the Portuguese era and were carried through the 
resistance and its generally elite leadership. As one respondent summarised: ‘I was 
involved for 24 years. My life is the same. Those who were small, are still small. 
Those who were rich, they are still rich. There has been no result’ (SUR78). What 
this research suggests is that while the actions ‘on the veranda’ may act to ‘correct’ 
perceived unfairness in the pensions law, they also continue to funnel resources to 
those within their networks.  
Regarding limitations and alternate theories, the high level of ineligible combatants 
who were registered for pensions at the time of fieldwork may be driven by additional 
factors, including technical problems or more widespread systems of corruption that 
were not disclosed during the research. Similarly, as this work was done during the 
fraught registration and verification process, it can only provide a snapshot in time. 
While claims of nepotism and corruption appear credible, they are extremely difficult 
to verify. More work is needed, both to determine if the high registration levels were 
maintained, as well as more qualitative work examining the effects of different 
pension levels (or the lack thereof) on relations amongst those who fought. While 
other scholars have examined the connection between economic inequality and 
conflict (Nafziger, W. and Auvinen, J. 2002.), work examining how these distributive 
policies affect conflict in Timor-Leste would be useful, as would be work on their 
impact on Timor-Leste’s fiscal health and labour markets. 
CONCLUSION 
In exploring the business conducted on the veranda and the performance of the state 
at the margins, this article looks at why the pension programmes have grown so 
large and the role of state commissioners therein. In a 2002 interview, Taur Matan 
Ruak,xiii the former armed resistance leader and Timorese President (2012-2017), 
distilled the issue at the heart of what makes the design of benefits programmes in 
Timor-Leste so difficult:  
If we were to recognize all those who supported our struggle, we would have to extend this 
recognition to most of the population, as all have, at some point in time and in their own 
way, participated in the liberation of our nation (in Meden, 2002: 3).  
Now, over a decade later, Taur Matan Ruak’s description is prescient. This article 
argues that the drive to recognise those in the struggle has lead to ‘corrective’ 
measures by the commissioners, which, along with nepotism and patronage, have 
resulted in the widespread registration of individuals that otherwise would not have 
been in line for veterans’ pension benefits. This inflation is not insignificant, as the 
registration programme now comprises almost 9 per cent of the national budget.  
 
This article has underscored the role of street level bureaucrats – the commissioners 
– in shaping the ways that laws come to fruition. This article observes that these 
commissioners have used ‘their new position to reinforce their authority’ (Boege et al, 
2008: 8) and undermine the laws coming from the capital by re-writing them in the 
field. The simultaneous extension and challenging by non-state authorities of the 
state through these programmes complicates conventional state-building models that 
position state and non-state authorities as both separate and substitutes (e.g. as one 
site of authority increases, the other decreases). This suggests a limitation to the 
powers of both bureaucratic elites and external actors, including the United Nations 
and international advisors, suggesting the presence of processes on the veranda that 
run alongside or out of view of imperial state-building (Chopra 2000). 
 
It also raises questions about sites of resistance to or, more cynically, co-option of 
liberal state-building practices, including surveillance and legal classification as a 
means of governance. While this article suggests that the deviation from the written 
laws has reduced some conflict and aligned registration more closely with local views 
on merit and service, it also recognises the ways in which the pensions programme 
has also reproduced non-state resistance-era networks of inclusion and exclusion, 
even as it arises from outside international and state structures.   
 
Overall, this work further reinforces the importance of researchers stepping outside 
the air conditioning and moving beyond the written legislation. As discovered in the 
field, the commissioners consistently applied a lex non scripta to make their 
decisions regarding service and recognition. This not trivial: here we see how 
significant post-conflict spending policy, and thus the distribution of resources in a 
fragile post-conflict economy, comes to reflect the preferences and interests of 
former conflict actors. This will have long-term, intergenerational effects on who wins 
and who loses in Timor-Leste’s recovery. The outcome of veterans’ pensions policy, 
and its outsized impact on the national budget and development planning, cannot be 
understood without attention to both le climatiseur et la veranda, and how policy is 
made – and re-made – in each location.  
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i  For example, the UK Department for Work and Pensions estimates that fraudulent or 
erroneous payments constitute 2.1 per cent of benefits expenditure. See: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/271140/fraud-
and-error-in-the-benefit-system-2012-13_estimates-first-release.pdf. 
ii It is instructive to consider the value of pensions and transfer payments in the context of 
chronic poverty: 41 per cent of Timorese live below the poverty line (RDTL Budget, 2011: 20). 
At its current level, the lowest level of monthly pension is over eight times greater than the 
average monthly earnings of Timorese citizens based on non-oil GDP (391 USD per year; 
RDTL Budget, 2011). Fifteen individuals recognized for their prominent roles in national 
liberation are entitled to 750 USD/month – a staggering sum, more than double average 
yearly income. 
iii Mari Alkatiri, Ana Pessoa and Xanana Gusmão are all prominent resistance figures and 
early leaders. During the occupation, both Alkatiri, who served as Prime Minister from 2002-
2006 and 2017-present, and Pessoa, an experienced lawyer and MP, resided in 
Mozambique. Upon their return to Timor-Leste, both became important leaders of the 
FRETILIN political party.  By contrast, Gusmão spent the occupation leading the FALINTIL 
resistance movement, until his incarceration in 1992; he became the country’s first President 
and later Prime Minister as the leader of the CNRT party. These different backgrounds and 
different views of the resistance – FRETILIN has emphasized the early, armed rather than 
clandestine movement – played out in this dispute.     
iv The verification of veterans’ pension registration data has been carried out across Timor-
Leste by teams representing the Commission for Tribute, Supervision of Registration and 
Appeals (CHSRR). Their fundamental task is to verify that a) those who are registered served 
and, b) are registered for the correct level of service. The CHSRR was designed to operate 
through five-person councils in each of the country’s 65 sub-districts. These teams were to be 
composed on the ‘former CNRT sub-district level official, the Nurep … local level former 
members of the clandestine front, and a member of the CHSRR’ (World Bank, 2008: 16). 
These team members are referred to as ‘Commissioners’ throughout this article, reflecting the 
common usage by respondents. 
v  Much of the literature on street-level bureaucrats, for example, focuses on how 
implementers change policies to respond to the practical, environmental constraints that they 
face, particularly around time, funding, and capacity; while these additional factors may also 
be relevant in Timor-Leste, they are not considered herein.  
vi  Controversially, this may partially account for the absence of mutual recognition I 
encountered by women registered putatively part of the resistance-era women’s organisations 
within a sub-district or even village (see Roll, 2014). 
vii The choice of a rights framework is interesting. Just as Kent found in terms of victims’ 
mobilisation, by using a rights framework commissioners have appropriated and reproduced 
‘“official” discourses of justice and nationbuilding’ (Kent, 2011: 436). 
viii Since the time the research was conducted, a new category of service has been added to 
specifically recognise the contributions of the 12 November participants. 
ix  Similarly the resistance-era clandestine groups RENETIL and Sagrada Familia have 
produced their own registries. According to a UN source, the Sagrada Familia list has been  
‘accepted as valid data for the commissions’ list [and] manipulated accordingly’ (INT63). 
x Whether or not supervisors agree with policy is, as May and Winter (2007) have found, a 
key factor in determining whether or not street-level implementers implement policies with 
which they disagree. Here buy-in throughout an organisation emerges as critical for the 
delivery of a programme in line with drafters’ intentions.  
xi A similar observation about the counter-intuitive, short- to mid-term benefits to stability of 
disregarding legal guidelines has been documented regarding contracting in post-conflict 
Timor-Leste and Aceh (Myrttinen, 2012: 239) and DDR programmes in Tajikistan (Torjesen 
and MacFarlane, 2007: 322). 
xii Reflecting the power of those involved in the legislative drafting, involvement in the law 
allows those with elite roles in the Indonesian occupying government or armed forces to be 
eligible. The World Bank describes this as a ‘pragmatic choice given that many in the 
                                                                                                                                      
resistance movement, including some very prominent figures, were at certain times members 
of the Indonesian administration or army, and who would often use their position to support 
the resistance’ (2008: 21).  
xiii Nom de guerre of José Maria Vasconcelos.    
